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Abstract 
The EU Commission has started to update its Audiovisual Media Services Directive as part 
of its larger push to implement its Digital Single Market Strategy. It is expected that this will 
not be just a light fix for some of the ‘bugs’ in the regulation, but a major overhaul motivated 
by the significant changes in media systems related mostly to media convergence and 
globalisation. In this context this paper offers a small country’s view of these processes. It 
demonstrates in detail how Estonia, a very small country on the EU periphery, is challenged 
by the need to develop its positions with regard to the complex processes at the EU level. It 
discusses the ‘impossible conflicts’ that it encounters when trying to articulate its media 
policies and EU strategies. It also describes the complexities of developing media policy in a 
country where different government institutions are shaped by different ideological 
frameworks, and therefore have different policy goals; and how cultural policy goals tend to 
be sacrificed when they are in conflict with various techno-economic imperatives. 
 
 
Introduction 
This article is about the limited degrees of freedom of a very small EU country to drive its 
audiovisual policy and about the dilemmas it encounters at a time of convergence, 
globalisation and turbulent international affairs. The fact that media convergence and the 
associated internationalisation make it increasingly more difficult to effectively regulate 
national or regional media markets is a widely discussed phenomenon (e.g. Jassem, 2010; 
Latzer, 2014). What has also been established is the understanding that European media 
policy is increasingly driven by economic imperatives and less by cultural goals such as 
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diversity or enlightenment (e.g. Celsing, 2010; Jõesaar, 2015). Further, the specific 
limitations on media markets in Europe’s small member states have been evidenced in a 
series of works (e.g. Lowe and Nissen, 2011; Puppis, 2009; Trappel, 2014). However, what 
this article aims to demonstrate is the difficulties experienced by small peripheral European 
states in regard to the combination of all the aforementioned aspects – convergence  and 
small size within the EU single market, as well as the broader globalisation of media markets 
– plus the new situation related to international security (i.e. threats of Russian aggression 
towards Eastern European countries materialised in propagandistic media content aimed at 
the population within these countries). The difficult challenges presented to these smaller 
countries (this case study being about Estonia) by a combination of these aspects comprise 
the topic of this article. At the current stage, these challenges have become especially visible 
as the EU is preparing to enforce its Digital Single Market (DSM) strategy (European 
Commission, 2015) and, in this connection, also update the Audiovisual Media Services 
Directive (AVMSD, European Commission, 2010). Therefore, the specific case in this article 
reports on Estonia’s inner struggles resulting from the need to develop its positions in regard 
to these EU-level regulatory efforts. The article analyses in detail the nature of the 
discussions and arguments involving the different governmental offices and agencies that 
have eventually led to the articulation of official government positions with regard to these 
EU-level processes. The article aims to explicate the uncertainties and ‘impossibilities’ that 
the policymakers in such countries tend to meet.  
 
Context 
Estonia’s internal market is very small – with 1.3 million inhabitants, the advertising market 
totalled only € 88 million in 2014 (TNS Emor, 2015). Furthermore, the advertising market is 
fragmenting with money gradually leaving TV and dispersing across the penumbra of online 
platforms, thereby often leaving the national media system. Therefore, especially after the 
advertising market crashed during the recession, it is increasingly obvious that the market 
fails to support the commercial TV industry (Ibrus, 2015c). Relatedly, one of main media 
policy questions is how to keep the commercial broadcasters afloat and to empower the 
Public Service Broadcaster to curate the national cultural space. Furthermore, when it comes 
to the independent content producers, a new policy aim has been established in the last few 
years to focus on their capability to export their productions and services (Ibrus, 2015a). That 
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is, the overall aim of the country’s cultural policy is to strengthen national media in the 
context of globalisation. 
 However, this cultural policy goal may not be in harmony with Estonia’s other policy 
goals within the EU. To analyse these contradictions, let me first provide a survey of which 
institutions in Estonia are responsible for media-related policymaking and for establishing 
EU-related strategy. In the first place, there are the two ministries – the Ministry of Culture 
and the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. Officially it is the Ministry of 
Culture that is responsible for cultural policymaking, including audiovisual affairs. Yet, the 
Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications is responsible for closely related techno-
economic issues, such as telecommunications, broader ‘information society’ development, as 
well as advertising regulation. Furthermore, the Technical Regulatory Authority, which in 
Estonia also performs the functions of an independent media regulator, operates in the 
administrative area of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications. All this means 
that the two ministries are set to co-regulate the media domain – one based on cultural policy 
rationales, the other on technical and economic rationales.  
 Regarding contemporary EU affairs, it is also the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications that is responsible for the EU Digital Single Market strategy, which is 
understood to include the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. Furthermore, within 
Estonia’s European Union Policy1 audiovisual affairs are part of the competition policy 
section, which is also a responsibility of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and 
Communications. The latter has become a special source of tension over the last decade since 
audiovisual policy issues at the European level are largely discussed from the perspective of 
broader market regulation (where Estonia’s general view favours liberalisation), while 
cultural policy goals are deemed to be secondary. Here the broader context is that, on the one 
hand, Estonia has earned international recognition for its wealth of public online services (for 
instance Chakravorti et al., 2015) and, on the other hand, Estonia has also turned this into its 
core theme in international affairs and European Union policy – the universal provision of 
digital public services, cybersecurity, internet freedom, network architecture, sharing 
economy, startup culture, etc., are the themes that it uses to present itself as being in the know. 
Therefore, the ideology that pervades its official positions in Brussels is one emphasising 
                                                 
1
 See: https://riigikantselei.ee/en/european-union 
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internet freedom, global free trade for all kinds of goods and general market liberalisation. 
Relatedly, the cultural policy rhetoric on ‘protecting’ Europe’s cultural diversity is usually 
avoided if not critically approached by Estonia’s representatives of digital affairs. 
‘Protectionism’ has clear negative implications in this discourse.  
 The same approach is also generally supported by Estonia’s Government Office, which 
coordinates all the country’s actions and strategising in relation to EU affairs. The 
Government Office is effectively the prime minister’s office and therefore one should be 
aware that for the last 10 years the prime ministers of Estonia have came from the Reform 
Party, which for the most part represents a neoliberal ideology. Most importantly, Andrus 
Ansip, Estonia’s previous prime minister, has become the European Commission’s vice-
president directly responsible for the Digital Single Market strategy. Relatedly, it has become 
Estonia’s unofficial agenda to ‘support’ Ansip in his efforts to make the digital single market 
strategy happen. Therefore, a broad market-driven and explicitly neo-liberal rhetoric 
dominates both the domestic consultations as well as Estonia’s official positions in Brussels 
and elsewhere in the EU. The discourse of the Government Office representatives generally 
downplays the specifics of cultural policy and the references to it are minimised – generally 
with the argument that ‘cultural diversity’ is already referred to in EU treaties and therefore is  
‘a given’ and requires no further mention. However, this discourse minimisation has resulted 
in Estonia not pursuing any significant agenda on improving the cultural diversity within the 
EU and its member states. 
 It can be argued that this is related to the size of the country and its media market; i.e. 
the country is very small, and therefore, although the broader discourse on media policy is 
driven by economic arguments, it is generally not about prioritising the growth of its 
economic capacity – the media sector’s ability to export. Although a ‘cash rebate’ 
programme is newly in place, which is designed to facilitate growth in the provision of 
production services, there is no tradition of defending the interests of its media industries 
when it comes to the country’s economic policies, because to date these industries have been 
economically insignificant, especially in regard to export income. Therefore, instead of being 
about fighting for better opportunities for its own media industries, the arguments about 
‘enabling a free market’ in Europe, have focused on enabling access to services provided in 
other countries for Estonian consumers. This also comprises the context of the discussions on 
the practices of geo-blocking access to content in the digital single market. That is, since the 
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Estonian market is small and not very profitable for global online services such as Netflix, 
Hulu, Amazon Prime, etc., they are normally not legally available on its territory. This has 
been met with consumer frustration that also feeds policy goals. The fact that Ansip’s rhetoric 
on the DSM strategy initially focused mainly on forbidding geo-blocking results from his 
own personal experience and that of his compatriots.  
 It can be argued that this ‘Estonian experience’ has also been translated into how 
Estonia’s civil servants dealing with economic affairs view the relationships between the EU 
and the rest of the world and its industries. Regarding the international trade of digital goods 
and services, the Estonian position is effectively a fear that too much regional regulation 
could discourage global players from providing their services in Europe; i.e. that access may 
suffer, and the range of services available to the European consumer may decrease. For 
instance, if Netflix’s offer is perceived as ‘better’ by the consumers, this is regarded as an 
absolutely self-evident fact that can lead to only one possible policy goal – to facilitate access 
to it. The questions about why and how is it better or is it ‘good enough’ in regard to various 
cultural policy goals are generally not asked.  
 Related arguments touch upon the startup culture. According to popular knowledge in 
Estonia the number of startups per capita is the highest in Europe and this is due to a range of 
policy initiatives based on the general cultural enthusiasm related to ‘digital business.’ The 
dominant discourse view is that ‘anything is possible’ in the internet economy. Scalable 
businesses can spring up anywhere and therefore a) regulation is bad as it may curb 
innovation and b) there is less concern for existing oligopolies since the belief is that markets 
tend to disrupt those every now and again. What is ignored is the specific tendency in media 
markets to always strive towards oligopolistic structures and the rather universal fitness of 
these structures once they mature. And, as we have demonstrated (Ibrus and Ojamaa, 2014)  
it is nearly impossible, specifically for audiovisual industry startups, to make it big at least in 
the Nordic-Baltic region – the growth opportunities are limited due to the various path 
dependencies and other mechanisms that have locked in the market structures. 
 
Cases and methods 
 
The context of the socioeconomic aspects and discursive constellations described above is 
relevant in order to interpret the closely intertwined processes of Estonia’s articulation of 
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three policy documents related to audiovisual media regulation in the EU. These are the 
following: Estonia’s response to the European Commission’s communication on the Digital 
Single Market strategy (Summer 2015); Estonia’s response to the European Commission’s 
public consultation regarding the Audiovisual Media Services Directive (Summer and 
Autumn 2015); the compilation of “Estonia’s European Union Policy 2015–2019” 
framework document (Spring-Autumn 2015). I will briefly describe the rationales for these 
three documents below.  
 The Estonian position on DSM was formulated as a government resolution
2
 in response 
to Latvia, as the country holding the presidency of the Council of the European Union in the 
first half of 2015. The EU Commission had published its communication on DSM on May 6
th
 
(European Commission, 2015) and the presidency then requested the positions of all member 
countries, in order for them to be combined and discussed in different Council of the EU 
meetings and eventually approved at the Council of the EU meeting attended by the heads of 
states. 
 The Estonian position on AVMSD was also formulated as a governmental resolution 
(European Commission, 2015)
3
 but this was in response to the Commission’s public 
consultations that were part of its broader REFIT analysis assessing the existing and future 
functionalities of AVMSD. The REFIT that consists of a multitude of sub-analyses was 
launched in the spring of 2015 and the results should be published in mid-2016.  
 The framework document called “Estonia’s European Union Policy 2015–2019”4 is 
produced every four years after the parliamentary elections with the expectation that the new 
government will achieve the goals articulated in the strategy document during the subsequent 
four years. The document is formalised again by a government resolution, after being 
approved by the parliament. Regarding the historical context, it should be emphasised that all 
three documents were discussed at a time when Estonia had just elected a new parliament and 
a government (a broad coalition consisting of centre-right liberals, conservatives and social 
democrats), which means that the document was drafted at a time when there was actually 
                                                 
2
 https://dhs.riigikantselei.ee/avalikteave.nsf/documents/NT002357AA/%24file/15-01129-
3.pdf 
3
 https://dhs.riigikantselei.ee/avalikteave.nsf/documents/NT002549DE/%24file/15-01433-
6.pdf 
4
 The new document is not formally accepted yet. See the previous one here: 
https://riigikantselei.ee/sites/default/files/content-editors/Failid/eesti_el_poliitika_eng.pdf 
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little political leadership, at least in the Ministry of Culture. Therefore, the document was 
drafted mostly by civil servants from various ministries and approved as such by the 
politicians.  
 But what research method did I use to make many of the assessments in the 
introduction and the following sections? This paper is based on two methods – documentary 
analysis on the one hand and participatory observation on the other. Both are related to the 
fact that, in addition to my academic roles, during the last two and a half years, I have served 
as an advisor for audiovisual affairs at the Estonian Ministry of Culture and have therefore 
represented Estonia in EU Council’s Audiovisual Working Group. I also participated in 
drafting all the documents referred to above, and in the related negotiations between the 
different relevant governmental institutions. In connection with these roles I had access to all 
the relevant documents, e-mails and meetings. I took notes at these meetings. Since no 
consent was asked from the participants for the data to be used in academic research, all the 
sources have been rendered anonymous and the statements have been generalised. The 
collected data has still been used in the research since the processes were effectively 
participatory (many societal institutions were invited to contribute their opinions and 
participate in discussions) and the results were effectively made public in the various phases 
of the processes.  
 
 
European content production and market facilitation  
 
In the following analysis I will focus on two main discussions that were the main sources of 
disagreement between the different factions of Estonian officialdom. The first is how to 
facilitate the demand for European audiovisual productions in the digital single market and 
therefore increase production of European works. How to motivate the production and 
mediation of European works has been one of the main rationales of AVMSD and, it can be 
argued, one of its successes. Historically, American dominance in the international export 
markets for film and television content has been facilitated by its huge monolingual domestic 
market that has enabled a rich generic variety in production and  good average returns from 
the home market, which in combination has enabled significant flexibility in export strategies. 
Historically, Europe, which is a conglomerate of fragmented small national markets, could 
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not compete with the flexibility and related market power of the North-American distributors. 
But AVMSD (and the directives and conventions that preceded it), with its provisions that 
required 50% of the programmes of all European broadcasters to originate from Europe and 
10% of content to be commissioned from independent producers, has to some extent 
neutralised the limitations imposed by European market fragmentation. I have argued (Ibrus, 
2015b) that the increasing export of European content, not only within Europe but also 
internationally (Scandinavian drama series, UK TV formats, etc.), has originally been 
expedited by the provisions of AVMSD. This directive has functioned as a market 
coordination mechanism that has facilitated the growth of demand for original European 
content and also has encouraged European producers to invest in development, innovation 
and quality, which in turn has resulted in further demand in Europe and elsewhere. Therefore, 
based on this success, it is expected that these provisions of the AVMSD will continue to be 
of central importance in the future.  
 Yet, these expectations are challenged by convergence. It appears that the main 
stakeholders both in Estonia and internationally agree that regulations for different 
audiovisual content transmission or distribution technologies or platforms will need to be 
harmonised, and therefore, AVMSD will also have to start dealing with various internet-
enabled platforms other than broadcasting on equal terms. This is not the case in the existing 
AVMSD: online ‘newspapers’ are exempted from AVSMD and the regulations for non-linear 
video services are much more lenient than for broadcasting. The argumentation for regulatory 
convergence, used by the Ministry of Culture, emphasised that the sector has already 
converged when it comes to all aspects of the value chain – consumption, distribution, 
production. Most media service providers utilise various cross-media strategies and diversify 
their services across different transmission or distribution technologies; most content travels 
across multiple platforms; and most users access media services and content on a variety of 
channels or platforms. In this situation, trying to sustain different regulatory regimes for 
different technologies would create unnecessary complications for all the parties and unfair 
conditions for the players that are focused mainly on specific technologies such as linear 
broadcasting; hence, the perception that regulations also need to converge. However, that 
would also mean the end of the existing regulatory tradition. 
 As mentioned briefly in the introduction, the central logic of AVMSD is that in order to 
provide a ‘media service’ one would need to apply for a license (from the regulatory 
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authority of one of the member states). However, the E-Commerce Directive (European 
Commission, 2000) maintains that business in the internet should not be based on member 
states issuing relevant licenses – i.e. the right to provide any kind of service online should be 
made available and free to all. The presumption here is that this freedom promotes innovation 
and equal opportunities for startup companies in any field of the digital economy. But this 
would also mean that audiovisual media services provided in the internet would not require a 
license. But, if there is a need for convergent technology-neutral regulation would that mean 
that broadcasting should also be liberalised? This was the core dispute for Estonian 
policymakers in the different governmental institutions. The representatives of the Ministry 
of Economic Affairs suggested that it might be the right time for liberalising the broadcasting 
market; while the people from the Ministry of Culture sought ways to make online players 
accountable to regulatory authorities and observe both the AVMSD and the national 
legislation of the countries where the services are provided and/or consumed. It was 
eventually agreed that perhaps some sort of ‘registration’ for internet companies should be 
instituted. 
 But what kind of registration should it be and who should do the registering? The 
Ministry of Culture suggested a new approach to accommodate both views. In line with prior 
suggestions, for instance, by Tambini (2012) the proposal was made that the new regulatory 
regime for the convergent media era should be based on size. As Tambini (ibid.) put it, “The 
principle should be that the size of the enterprise, and its importance in opinion formation, 
rather than medium of delivery, should determine the framework for responsibility and 
accountability. Larger enterprises should be subject to more public-interest regulation and 
accountability enforcement.” Relatedly, the suggestion from the Ministry of Culture was that 
the smallest media service providers (in terms of audience and therefore socio-cultural 
impact) would be exempt from most of the provisions of AVMSD, including the obligation 
for either registering or obtaining licenses. But as the audience for the services increased, 
new rules and obligations would be applied – with the high demand for globally dominant 
media brands also expected to dominate the digital single market. Such an approach would be 
based on the principles of internet freedom – anybody can set up a business and communicate 
freely online, but as the impact of the service increases, it would be justified to turn them 
accountable in the public interest. For instance, if Netflix turns out to dominate the DSM, all 
aspects of its business conduct would need to become more transparent and standardised for 
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all the market players (including national regulators). It would also need to start highlighting 
works from all the member countries, as well as start investing in new content from all the 
regions of the EU. The issue of how such service providers could be made to contribute to 
new content production is an unresolved and widely disputed question in Europe. Different 
ideas have been floated starting from VAT being paid in the countries where the consumption 
(of online content) occurs with the countries re-investing this money by supporting new 
content production. There are also new ideas regarding the institution of a new European tax 
for this purpose, or making the big players invest funds to commission new content that 
would equal a certain percentage of their turnover.  
 The view of Estonian Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications was that 
none of these is really acceptable since they could all have a detrimental effect on the 
provision of audiovisual services in Europe – i.e. the large American brands could potentially 
retreat from Europe and thereby limit the freedom of choice of European consumers. The 
other main argument against extending the logic of the existing AVMSD to non-linear 
internationally provided VOD-services was that the content of digital catalogues cannot be 
regulated similarly to linear broadcast programmes. Mostly because these catalogues may be 
structured and used in very different ways. For instance, the provision of the video content 
related to current affairs by the internationally notorious Estonian portal Delfi is updated 
daily. At the same time, Netflix organises its catalogue of professionally produced material 
based on dynamically changing genre-categories (Madrigal, 2014) and YouTube is mostly a 
video-sharing service, whereas the content offered to users is based on their search queries 
and previous activities on its website. In this context, trying to make sure that 50% of 
YouTube content is of ‘European origin’ or 10% is commissioned from independent 
providers would not make much sense. Therefore, the attempts to regulate catalogues are 
becoming unpopular in European policy circles and discussions on making service providers 
invest based on turnover are being introduced. However, as already discussed, the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs disapproved of this. Therefore, their suggestion for compensating the 
potential loss of private investments into the distribution and commissioning of European 
works was to simply increase the funding for the European Commission’s MEDIA 
programme – an EU programme funding audiovisual production. Yet, the problem with this 
proposal is that this would prevent the market (consisting of thousands of agents) from being 
able to coordinate supply and demand, as well as innovation practices leading to diversity. 
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Instead the entire sector in Europe would become even more dependent on public support 
with small juries gathering in Brussels to decide unilaterally on ever greater chunks of 
content supply in Europe. This would eventually not contribute to real diversity in the market 
and ignore grassroots knowledge on the audience demand for specific kinds of content in 
different parts of Europe and in different audience segments. After extensive disputes, the 
following was agreed upon and eventually turned into government statement: an entirely new 
‘combination of measures and regulations’ should be developed to secure original content 
provision in Europe. This abstract statement is another way to say that Estonia could not 
agree internally on a new comprehensive strategy. The confusion caused by the new 
regulatory challenges for all the governmental institutions was so great that they agreed to 
leave it up to the EC to make more concrete proposals.  
 Still, the Ministry of Culture achieved a small victory when Estonia officially stated 
one more thing. It pointed out there was a need to analyse the potential for the further 
concentration of media content provision in the DSM and its subsequent effects on cultural 
diversity in Europe. Thereby Estonia discussed potential development not part of AVMSD, 
but with effects that could be neutralised by AVMSD. This development is the EC plan to 
minimise the ‘unjustified geoblocking’ practice by media service providers – i.e. the practice 
of only enabling access to a media service from the national territories for which they control 
the copyrights or have licenses. This potential development was not received well by AV-
industry representatives anywhere in Europe since territory-by-territory sales of rights has 
enabled them to fund filmmaking more effectively. As a reaction to industry criticism, the EC 
representatives have recently explained that their aim is only to enable content ‘portability’ 
(i.e. if the right to consume certain content or access a service was obtained in one member 
state, the consumer would get the right to consume that same service/content in any other 
member state). However, many analysts point out that such practices when implemented may 
still resemble a form of ‘passive sales’ and therefore undermine the content production 
industry’s business models.  
 In this context, Estonia recalled that any media market has a tendency to evolve 
towards an oligopolistic structure. This is due to many factors including the economies of 
scope and scale logics; network externalities securing the market lock-in; the dominance of a 
very small number of players in the internet economy, etc. But it is also due to a few large 
American players (Netflix, Amazon, Hulu, Google Play, etc.) having close relationships with 
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the dominant American film and TV content distributors (Warner Bros., Sony, etc.) and, 
therefore, being able to broker comprehensive and occasionally exclusive deals with them. 
This is another reason why the perception has increased that Jeremy Tunstall’s book The 
Media Were American (2008) may have been a bit too optimistic – the American dominance 
in the EU’s new digital single market is looming (see also Cunningham and Silver, 2013). 
And the problem is not specifically about the American origins of these new services, but 
simply about the nature of their existing business conduct that do not seem to be oriented to 
facilitating cultural diversity in Europe (Grece et al., 2015). Further, in the era of ‘attention 
economy’ (Goldhaber, 1997) their dominance is expected not to empower the national media 
systems of the member states – i.e. players such as the public service media institutions of 
smaller member states will not be well placed to compete for licenses (Netflix has openly 
admitted to preferring exclusive global licenses - see Spangler, 2015) or to compete for 
audience attention with the global players and their deep pockets. It was especially the latter 
concern that motivated the Estonian Ministry of Culture to fight for Estonia’s official position 
to include the concern for potential media concentration and its subsequent negative effects 
on cultural diversity in Europe. Since the government position was eventually articulated as a 
need to study the potential effects, the other government factions did not resist despite being 
explicitly unconcerned about the effects that the market structure had on culture. Yet, Estonia 
stopped short of articulating what ‘market concentration’ would mean in the DSM. Does it 
refer to a specific size of a media service provider in either a national market or the EU single 
market? And the various size-thresholds that would make media companies subject to the 
more demanding provisions of the new AVMSD also remained unarticulated. The reason for 
this openness was the inability of the small team of Estonian experts to work on and assess 
these thresholds. Therefore, they only proposed the size-based regulation as an abstract 
concept and an instrument against potential market concentration in the single market and left 
it to the EC to figure out the specifics.  
 
Country of origin and national security 
 
Although Estonia suggested to the EC that regulatory convergence and equal terms should 
apply to different forms of media when it came to consumer protection issues (protection of 
minors, advertising of alcohol, tobacco and other problematic substances, etc.), what is 
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specific to the Estonian expectations (and that of the other Baltic states and Poland) for the 
new AVMSD is that the design should also support the national security of the member states. 
This is a significant and historically specific aspect. AVMSD was designed as an instrument 
to facilitate the internal market for audiovisual services in the EU and its central imperative is 
to warrant the free flow of information and freedom of speech within Europe. It is for this 
reason that the directive makes it very hard to legally restrict the retransmission of television 
channels from other member states (Article 3). However, in recent years the Baltic states 
have felt the need to restrict the retransmission of Russian television channels that have 
acquired licenses from another member states (often the UK, Luxembourg, and Sweden). The 
view of the Baltic states has been that the Russian state-owned television channels 
deliberately transmit hate speech and propaganda content aimed at destabilizing their 
societies by influencing their significant Russian-speaking minorities. Although recent 
research shows that the impact of Russian media on the world perception of the Russian-
speaking audiences in the Baltics is minimal (Dougherty and Kaljurand, 2015), the 
understanding is that Russia’s newly aggressive foreign policy is aiming to make these 
minorities hostile to their local governments and thereby increase Russia’s influence in their 
near abroad. In light of the events in Ukraine many also fear similar Russian aggression in 
other countries. Therefore, it is understood that media is an increasingly important 
component of Russia’s ‘hybrid warfare’ (Pomerantsev, 2014) and hence it is important to 
prepare for it by implementing media policy including the AVMSD.  
 The fact that the existing directive does not suit the new geopolitical circumstances has 
been repeatedly demonstrated by the Baltic states recently. Latvia and Lithuania stopped the 
retransmission of a few Russian TV channels (NTV Mir, RTR Planeta, Rossya RTR) in the 
spring of 2014, at the height of the emergent war in Ukraine. Since they did so without 
following the procedures of AVMSD, they later needed to justify their actions to the EC, and 
against all odds were not fined as all the parties understood their rationales for doing so. 
Subsequently, Lithuania tested the length of  time required for the legally correct process for 
restricting retransmission (TV-channel RTR Planeta) to take effect and showed that it took 
almost a year. All Baltic countries have systematically stated that these processes need to be 
much swifter in times of crisis and therefore AVMSD must be updated in order to achieve 
this.  
 What changes does Estonia envisage in AVMSD? Interestingly, again the key is the 
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country of origin principle, but also includes other core concepts of the directive – i.e. how to 
define an ‘audiovisual media service’? As Article 1 of AVMSD prescribes, an ‘audiovisual 
media service’ is under the ‘editorial responsibility’ of a ‘media service provider’. Here 
‘editorial responsibility’ means the exercise of effective control over both the selection of the 
programmes and their organisation. ‘Media service provider’ refers to the natural or legal 
person who has editorial responsibility for the choice of the audiovisual content provided by 
the audiovisual media service and determines the manner in which it is organised. Paragraph 
3 of Article 3 of the directive says that a media service provider is deemed to be established 
in a member state when its main editorial office is in that member state, and most of the 
editorial decisions are taken in that member state. Altogether this means that a media service 
acquires a jurisdiction, a ‘country of origin’ within the EU, only if it has an actual editorial 
office in one of the member states and when that office executes real editorial control over 
the content of the broadcast programming or the catalogue of on-demand video content. Yet, 
this core logic of the AVMSD is undermined by the paragraph 4 of Article 2, which says that 
channels can also get a jurisdiction in a member state if they use a satellite up-link situated in 
that member state or when they use satellite capacity appertaining to that member state. This 
means that based on these technical criteria it is possible to get a formal jurisdiction in the EU 
without having an actual editorial office in an EU member state. And this is what many TV 
channels from third countries including Russia have achieved. Either by using these technical 
criteria or by actually applying for a licence in countries such as United Kingdom that grant 
licenses more easily and later never monitor their content (the UK independent regulator 
Ofcom only tries cases or checks content after complaints). An example: the Baltic Media 
Alliance Ltd (BMA) that holds licenses for several TV channels targeting the Baltic states is 
formally established in the UK and registered at an office in Queens House, 180 Tottenham 
Court Road, London. More than 200 other companies are registered in that same office. BMA 
also broadcasts the most popular Russian-language TV channel in Estonia – PBK (First 
Baltic Channel – share 17.5%) – with most of its programming produced in Russia 
(effectively a version of Russia’s First Channel [Первый Канал] with some add-ons, such as 
news produced in Estonia). Hypothetically, if PBK were to systematically broadcast 
misinformation and hate speech about the Estonian authorities, the Estonian independent 
media regulator would be unable to legally stop the retransmissions quickly since the channel 
is licensed in the UK and the entire process would take nearly a year.  
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 Therefore, Estonia proposed to the EC that the ways to obtain a EU jurisdiction as well 
as later potentially invalidate it should be streamlined in the new AVMSD. Motivated by 
security issues, Estonia suggested that the country of origin should only refer to instances 
where there is indeed an actual editorial office with real control over the programme or the 
catalogue of the particular service in a member state. This would mean no jurisdiction for 
third-country services on technical grounds. However, the paradox is that, in the context of 
internet freedom issues, Estonia argued that the ‘country of origin’ and obligation to acquire 
licenses may be outdated and not fit for the new era. Therefore it left open the possibility for 
larger internet players to simply register their services in the EU, follow the broad provisions 
of the AVMSD, but otherwise carry out as normal – i.e. service EU consumers to the fullest 
extent even though its ‘content management office’ may be far from Europe. Yet, in relation 
to security issues, the opposite proposal was made – to simplify and thereby strengthen the 
country of origin statute – to force the main players to have actual editorial offices within EU 
borders. Of course, the first rationale is for online services and the second for broadcasting, 
but since the of IPTV, which means the technological convergence of the two, this old 
distinction has become obsolete and regulatory convergence is perceived as a way to respond 
to this. But would this convergence also mean that Netflix or Hulu, for instance, would now 
have to establish an ‘editorial office’ in one of the member states? Or if not, would the other 
option be to have everybody transmitting freely and geopolitical propaganda and 
destabilisation efforts would be tolerated? Or will internet/information/media freedom be 
undermined by ‘psychological defence’ (Jermalavicius and Parmak, 2012) strategies in times 
of perceived ‘hybrid warfare’. The paradox for small peripheral EU countries such as Estonia 
at this particular historical moment is that such conflicting rationales exist. From the 
perspective of these countries, when there is only one main regulatory instrument (AVMSD) 
that should deal with various perceived ‘threats’ coming from third countries – not only the 
potential dumping of large quantities of US content, but also all kinds of Russian propaganda 
– the term ‘protectionism’ acquires an entirely new meaning.  
 It is against this backdrop, where Estonia sees itself as a destination for 
cultural/information flows and very rarely as a ‘country of origin’ for content travelling to 
Europe, that it has also articulated a need for ‘countries of destination’ to be given additional 
legal powers. This would become handy in instances where a ‘foreign’ media service does 
not follow local advertising regulations and therefore has an unfair advantage in the particular 
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national market. Or when hate speech is systematically transmitted. Yet, the counterargument 
often used in Estonia’s internal discussion is that strengthening the rights of the ‘country of 
destination’ is a slippery slope that could lead to the free provision of services in the digital 
single market being undermined. And it would also provide a handy tool for potentially 
crypto-authoritarian regimes (Hungary has been referenced) to silence critical international 
media. Therefore, what Estonia agreed to propose is simply that a streamlined protocol 
should be established by AVMSD for countries of destination to negotiate the nature of a 
particular media service with their ‘origin countries’. However, this is another essential 
indicator of the dilemmas facing a very small liberally minded country in the context of the 
processes of media globalisation and convergence when trying to achieve specific (but 
largely conflicting) economic, cultural and security objectives with a single regulatory 
framework.  
 
Conclusion 
This article effectively tells two stories. Firstly, the story of the complexity behind how 
policies, official government positions and national strategies are shaped. Government is 
rarely a monolithic apparatus executing the will of the elected politicians or the imperatives 
of their party programmes. Instead, it is also affected by the infighting between different 
government (i.e. public service) factions, their complex negotiations and other multimodal 
dialogical practices. These factions can be characterised, and their conflicts shaped, by 
different ideological frameworks, specialised knowledge systems or reference groups (with 
different degrees of empowerment) and associated path dependencies or contingencies. In the 
specific case of the evolution of media policy in Estonia, this article identifies the ideological 
path dependencies in the participating governmental institutions and recognises that this is 
comprised partly of the ideological lock-ins that cause Estonia’s cultural policy goals to be 
sacrificed for other goals, such as broad market liberalisation and normative globalisation in 
the digital services sector, which is now perceived to include audiovisual culture (see  Jõesaar, 
2015). 
 The second story this article tells is how the same or similar tendencies are enforced 
externally in Estonia – how complex international developments are challenging a small 
peripheral country such as Estonia and how much freedom it has (if any) to design its 
national media system and ensure its survival. In this context, the article refers to the 
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‘impossibility’ of this mission – i.e. to the fact that a conflict exists between many of the 
country’s articulated goals. On the one hand, the peripheral country desires more access and 
internet freedom, but on the other, it worries about media concentration in the single market 
and about the evolving market dominance of global players that could have a detrimental 
effect on the existence of its own national media system. Furthermore, there are numerous 
perceived threats, including cultural homogenisation on the one hand and the incitement of 
ethnic conflict on the other. To counter and resolve these perceived threats in the context of 
all the other goals and to do so within a single regulative framework is undoubtedly a 
perplexing challenge. This article demonstrates the related confusion and uncertainty in 
Estonia’s governmental institutions (see Table 1 for the illustration of these complex 
conflicts).  
 
Table 1. Main EU media policy dilemmas as perceived and articulated by Estonian 
policy makers. 
 
Yet, the process of updating the AVMSD and enforcing the broader DSM strategy 
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‘surrounding’ it will take years. And, in addition to the very small countries such as Estonia, 
there will many much more empowered agents around the table, all aiming to shape the 
regulation according to their own views and needs. Some countries are more protectionist and 
others more liberal; there are larger countries with economically significant audiovisual 
industries whose interests need to be protected and there are smaller countries interested in 
better access, as well as defining their rights as ‘destination countries’.  But in addition to the 
countries, there is also the industry lobby together with its inherent infighting – content 
producers demanding more support for independent content; commercial broadcasters 
demanding a reduction in the quotas for European productions; public broadcasters arguing 
for regulatory protection against platforms; newspaper publishers opposed to their services 
being included in audiovisual regulation; online service providers warning against the 
regulation of the internet, etc. The EC will need to balance all these interests while also 
keeping in mind the broader vision of the EU audiovisual content ecosystem for the next ten 
or more years.  
 Although the maelstrom of forces at play is not very encouraging for very small 
countries in terms of achieving their goals, the EU mechanism still provides the odd 
opportunity for all countries to drive the entire apparatus. The Estonian case analysed in this 
article is important not only because it presents a view of the evolution of EU media 
policymaking from the periphery, which is often ignored (Micova, 2015), but also because 
Estonia will be presiding over the EU Council in the first half of 2018 when, according to 
many estimates, the final negotiations (the ‘trilogues’ between the EU Parliament, 
Commission and Council) on the new AVMSD will take place. Whether Estonia’s current 
vacillation, resulting from the disagreements between its governmental institutions as well as 
from the general confusion associated with the perceived ‘impossibility’ of the policy 
mission, will evolve into bold decisiveness and informed positions will also be crucial for the 
evolution of broader EU media policy. The observations in this article establish a context for 
much that will follow.  
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